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Don Harris


In 80% of accidents human error is one of the main causal factors. However, pilot error is not easy to de- fi ne. This paper looks at various ideas of what constitutes human error on the fl ight deck and critically examines some current models of error with respect to modern fl ight operations. The paper then looks at some methods by which error may be eliminated or managed before concluding with a contrasting view of fl ight safety, which rejects the simple idea of error and suggests that most accidents are the product of normal (but uncontrolled) working practices.


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